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Germany's Statutory Works Councils and
Employee Codetermination: A Model
for the United States?
CAROL D. RASNIC*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1957, business management in the Federal Republic of
Germany ("FRG")' has had a duty under the Labor-Management
Relations Act 2 to consult with employee works councils before imple-
menting significant management decisions. The parliament of the
FRG 3  expanded employee rights in 1976, by passing the
Codetermination Act.4 This Act requires the number of employee
representatives on the supervisory boards 5 of German companies to
equal the number of board members representing shareholder
interests.
In the United States, labor and management factions have long
debated the advisability of effecting such a system. However, before
analyzing the pragmatics of implementing employee works councils in
* Associate Professor of Labor Law, Virginia Commonwealth University. B.A., Uni-
versity of Kentucky, 1962; J.D., Vanderbilt University, 1965. Research for this Article was
funded in part by the Virginia Commonwealth University Grants-in-Aid for Faculty Program.
1. In 1948, after World War II, the British, French, and United States zones of occupa-
tion joined to create the FRG. Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic
of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117, T.I.A.S. No. 3425; see also Bruno Simma, Legal
Aspects of East-West German Relations, 9 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 97, 99 (1985). Before
reunification on October 3, 1990, the FRG consisted of the 11 West German states: Baden-
Wirttemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Saxony, North Rhine/Westphalia,
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein, and West Berlin. Since reunification,
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thiringen, the five
states of the former German Democratic Republic, as well as East Berlin, are also included in
the FRG. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der deutschen demokratis-
chen Republik iber die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands-Einisgungsvertrag-(Zweiter
Staatsvertrag) [Treaty on the Creation of German Unity], Sept. 6, 1990, F.R.G.-G.D.R., 104
PRESSE-UND INFORMATIONSAMT DER BUNDESREGIERRUNG BULLETIN 877 (F.R.G.).
2. Betriebsverfassungsgestz [BetrVG], 1988 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl.] I 2261.
3. The FRG's parliament is known as the Bundestag.
4. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbG], 1976 BGB1. 1 1153.
5. German corporation law provides for a supervisory board, which supervises and
elects the board of management. Aktiengesetz [AktG] §§ 76(3), 84, 1965 BGBI. 1 1089.
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the United States, the constitutionality of such a system must be
addressed.
This Article first describes the mechanisms of German works
councils and codetermination. Next, it compares the laws that are
applicable to collective bargaining in the FRG and in the United
States. This Article then considers the constitutional obstacles to in-
stituting works councils and codetermination in the United States.
Finally, this Article synthesizes German and United States law in an
effort to determine the feasibility of incorporating either works coun-
cils or codetermination, or both, into United States law.
II. WORKS COUNCILS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Many Western European legislatures have established
mandatory bodies comprised in part of employees, which serve as
consultants and advisors to management. Such statutes have been en-
acted not only in the FRG, 6 but also in Austria, France, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, and Spain.
7
The German Labor-Management Relations Act,8 which was en-
acted by the Parliament in 1952 and amended in 1972, applies to any
business with five or more employees. 9 However, it appears that only
very large firms comply with this legislative mandate. "0 Many smaller
companies of fifty or fewer employees do not establish the statutorily
required works councils." 1
The Labor-Management Relations Act requires businesses to es-
tablish a "works council" composed of representatives of employees
and management. 12 The employee representatives are elected by em-
ployees who are eighteen years of age or older and who have been
6. BetrVG.
7. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, WORKERS PARTICIPA-
TION IN DECISIONS WITHIN UNDERTAKINGS 85 (1981) [hereinafter ILO].
8. BetrVG.
9. Id.§l.
10. See 3 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA § 1.5(A)-(D)(1) (Kenneth Robert
Redden ed., perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990) [hereinafter MLSC]. Section 1.5(D)(1) states: "As a rule
it will be difficult to find a German enterprise employing more than 50 people which has not
established a works council." Id.
11. Manfred Weiss, Federal Republic of Germany, 9 COMP. LAB. L.J. 82, 83 (1987).
12. The number of employees on the works council increases as the number of people
employed increases. A business with 1000 employees must have 11 employees on its works
council. A business with 9000 employees must have 31 employees on its works council. A
business with more than 9000 workers must add an additional two employee members for each
additional 3000 employees. BetrVG § 9.
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employed at the company for at least six months.'3 Works council
members, who serve a term of four years, 14 are not paid for their ser-
vice on the council.15 The Act provides for blue-collar and white-
collar workers to be elected to the works council proportionately. 16
Those who are elected enjoy special protection against discharge and
suffer no job disadvantages because of their membership on the coun-
cil.17 Further, there is no conflict between works council membership
and membership in a union."' In fact, many union members also
serve on German works councils. 19
Under the Labor-Management Relations Act, an employer must
advise its works council before implementing a management decision
in the following areas: (1) rules governing employee conduct and
plant operation; 20 (2) transfer or termination of an employee; 21 and
(3) extraordinary discharge of an employee.22 Further, the Act lists
twelve areas in which the works council must be consulted and ap-
prove a workplace rule before it becomes effective. 23 Since the Act
13. Id. §§ 7, 8.
14. Id. § 21.
15. Id. § 37.
16. Id. §§ 5-10.
17. Id. § 37; KONDIGUNGSCHUTZGESETZ [KSchG] § 15(1).
18. ILO, supra note 7, at 141.
19. Id. at 137-38.
20. BetrVG § 90.
21. Id. § 99. This section applies only to firms that regularly employ more than twenty
employees who are entitled to vote. Id.
22. Id. § 102.
23. BetrVG section 87 lists those areas where works councils must be consulted and must
approve workplace rules before they become binding. They are:
1. Questions of order in the workplace and the behavior of employees in the
workplace;
2. The beginning and ending of daily working hours, including breaks, as well
as the number of hours to be worked on each day of the week;
3. Temporary shortening or lengthening of the normal working hours;
4. Time, place, and manner of payment of wages;
5. The establishment of general regulations regarding vacations and the vaca-
tion schedule, as well as the scheduling of the vacations of individual employees
when the employer and the employee involved cannot reach an agreement;
6. The introduction and application of technical devices designed to monitor
the behavior or performance of employees;
7. Rules relating to the prevention of work-related accidents and occupational
illnesses, as well as those relating to the protection of employee health in the frame-
work of statutory requirements or regulations for the prevention of accidents;
8. The form, extent, and administration of social measures whose effect is lim-
ited to the particular workplace, business sector or company;
9. The granting and denial of living quarters which are rented to the employee
in consideration of the employment relationship, as well as the basic rules for the use
of such living quarters;
10. Questions regarding the determination of wages, in particular the estab-
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prohibits strikes over workplace rules, conflicts are resolved through a
statutory arbitration process.24 The Act provides for the establish-
ment of either a permanent arbitration committee or an ad hoc com-
mittee. 25 As a practical matter, a permanent committee is rarely
named, due to the predictability that results when the same group
decides each dispute.
26
As the Labor-Management Relations Act does not set forth the
required number for membership on these arbitration committees,
their size is determined by the works council and the employer. 27 La-
bor and management must be equally represented, 28 with a neutral
chairperson chosen by the entire body.29 When the panel is unable to
agree on a chairperson, the local labor court 30 appoints one.31 Due to
the court's power to appoint, the chairperson is often a judge from
one of the labor courts.
3 2
The Act does not establish committee procedures, but because
the chairperson frequently is a labor law judge, the procedures are
generally similar to those of a labor court.33 The chairperson is usu-
ally well-paid by the employer. 34 If external members are appointed
lishment of general rules regarding wages, as well as the introduction and application
of new methods of payment, or a change in these methods;
11. The establishment of profit-sharing or bonus plans and comparable per-
formance-related compensation; and
12. Basic rules governing the company's suggestion system.
Id.
24. Id. § 76. Although the works council as an entity cannot strike to force an agreement
on a workplace rule, the individual council members who are union members may participate
in a union-authorized strike.
25. Id.
26. Weiss, supra note 11, at 84.
27. BetrVG § 76(1).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. In Germany, courts are classified according to subject matter (i.e., civil, criminal,
administrative, social, tax, and labor). Although there are state (Ldnder) courts, state and
federal courts apply the same federal law. Federal courts are the highest in the jurisdictional
hierarchy. For labor matters, the lowest court is the Arbeitsgericht, or labor court. Arbeitsger-
ichtsgesetz [ArbGG] §§ 14-31, 1990 BGBI II 889. The lowest level appellate court is the
Ldndesarbeitsgericht, or state labor court. Id. §§ 33-39. The highest appellate court is the
Bundesarbeitsgericht, or federal labor court. Id. §§ 40-45. There are no juries in Germany,
and lay persons typically serve as associate judges, with a professional judge as the chief judge.
31. BetrVG § 17(3).
32. Manfred Weiss, The Role of Neutrals in the Resolution of Interest Disputes in the
Federal Republic of Germany, 10 CoMp. LAB. L.J. 339, 350 (1988).
33. Weiss, supra note II, at 87.
34. Id. at 85; see also BetrVG § 76a(3) (requiring that the employer compensate the
chairperson).
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to provide expertise, the employer must compensate them as well. 35
The chairperson votes only in the case of a tie, and the local labor
court hears the appeals. 3 6 The arbitration process begins upon the
application of either party;37 however, because arbitration poses a
greater threat to the employer than to the works council, it has
proven to be a strong weapon for the works council.
38
In addition to consulting the works council about workplace
rules, an employer with twenty or more workers must inform the
works council before the employer transfers or terminates an em-
ployee. 39 The works council must respond within one week after noti-
fication of a planned employee transfer.4° The employer may proceed
with the transfer if the council consents to the transfer or fails to re-
spond within the statutory time period. 41 If the works council objects,
however, the employer may effect the transfer only by first appealing
to the labor court.42 This court will grant the appeal only if the coun-
cil's refusal was unjustified.
43
Under German law, an employer may discharge an employee
who has worked continuously for at least six months for one of the
following three reasons: (1) economic concerns unrelated to the em-
ployee;44 (2) the employee's personal condition;45 or (3) the em-
ployee's work-related misconduct or unacceptable work
35. According to the federal labor court, this pay must be at least 70% of the chairper-
son's pay. Judgment of May 11, 1976, 28 Entscheidungen des Bundesarbeitsgerichts [BAGEl
103. In practice, the internal and external members appointed by the employer generally are
not paid. See BetrVG § 76a(2); Weiss, supra note 11, at 85-86.
36. BetrVG § 78(4).
37. Id. § 76(5).
38. Weiss, supra note 32, at 352.
39. BetrVG § 99(1).
40. Id. § 99(3).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 99(4).
43. Examples of statutory justifications include the willful violation of an approved com-
pany rule, and unjust disadvantage to either the employee transferee or other employees result-
ing from the transfer. Weiss, supra note 32, at 352. The labor court limits its jurisdiction to
the issue of whether or not the works council exceeded its discretionary powers. Thus, only if
the council's refusal to approve a transfer was unjustified will the court permit the employer to
proceed with the transfer. Id.
44. "Betriebsbedingtkiindigung," or "discharge because of conditions." KSchG § 1(3).
If the employer plans to terminate employees because of business difficulties, the law requires
that the employer do so according to their seniority, age, and number of dependents. Id.
45. "Personenbedingtkiindigung," or "discharge because of personal conditions." Id.
§ 1(2). For example, the employer may legitimately discharge an employee who falls ill and is
unable to work.
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performance. 46 Discharge without prior notice to the works council is
illegal, and the employer cannot later correct a failure to notify the
works council of a planned termination. 47 Once notified by the em-
ployer, the works council has one week to respond to the proposed
termination.48 If the employer proceeds with the termination, the em-
ployee's recourse is to sue the employer in a local labor court, regard-
less of the council's earlier decision.
The powers of a German works council are generally classified as
the powers of information, consultation, codetermination, 49 and direct
autonomous management of some business actions. 50 The council is
competent to review economic questions, 51 staff problems, 52 and wel-
fare activities.
53
The German works council concept is not new. As early as
1848, the assembly in Frankfurt am Main considered a bill providing
for the establishment of factory councils. 54 Although the bill was ulti-
mately rejected, many German enterprises later established employee
46. "Verhaltungsbedingtkuindigung," or "discharge because of behavior." Id. The fed-
eral labor court has held that the employer must first warn an employee who is being consid-
ered for discharge due to the employee's work-related misconduct or unacceptable work
performance.
47. BetrVG § 102(1).
48. The Act specifies reasons for which the works council might refuse to approve a
termination. Id. § 102(3). BetrVG section 102(3) provides:
The Works Council can, within the period provided for by section 2(1), oppose the
termination when:
1. The employer, in selecting the employee to be terminated, has not considered, or
has insufficiently considered, social aspects;
2. The termination violates one of the guidelines established by the Works Council
for the selection of those to be hired, transferred or terminated;
3. The employee to be terminated can be further employed in another job at the
same workplace, or in another workplace of the same company;
4. It is possible, following a reasonable amount of retraining or further education,
to further employ the employee;
5. It is possible to further employ the employee under a different contractual basis,
and the employee has consented to such an arrangement.
Id.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 70-115, which discusses the Codetermination Act.
50. ILO, supra note 7, at 138.
51. Id. at 139. The works council's economic rights are, for the most part, merely in-
formative. In businesses with 100 or more employees, an economic committee of three to
seven employees meets monthly with management, and acts as a liaison between management
and the works council on all economic issues. BetrVG § 106.
52. ILO, supra note 7, at 139.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 138 (referring to G. ERDMANN, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER DEUTSCHE
SOZIALGESETZGEBUNG (1957) and H.J. TEUTEBERG, GESCHICHTE DER INDUSTRIELLEN
MITBESTIMMUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND (1961)).
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councils voluntarily."5 Later, the 1891 Labor Protection Act56 estab-
lished workers' committees, although the use of such committees was
left to the discretion of employers.57 During World War I, the Auxil-
iary Service Act 58 required the use of workers' committees.59 The
First Works Council Act of 192060 required works councils to actu-
ally participate in management decisions concerning social, personnel,
and economic matters.6' It did not, however, empower works coun-
cils to veto management decisions. The 1933 Order of National La-
bor Act 62 abolished the First Works Council Act of 1920, as well as
the Supervisory Board Act of 1922,63 which provided for the election
of employees to supervisory boards. 64 World War II taught the Ger-
man labor force that unity was imperative,65 and labor cooperated to
influence new post-war legislation.
After the end of World War II, the occupying powers put these
laws back into effect through the Allied Control Council Act No. 22
("Works Council Act"). 66 Individual states67 initially implemented
the Works Council Act. The federal government, however, super-
seded the Works Council Act with the 1952 Labor-Management Re-
lations Act, subsequently amended in 1972.68 Germany has since
firmly established worker participation at the plant level.
Employers felt a direct and substantial financial burden as a re-
sult of the implementation of works councils, since compliance with
the Act raised labor costs considerably. Additionally, an indirect cost
arose from the education of works council members in management
strategy. Nonetheless, the broadened powers of works councils have
not caused Germany any significant problems in recent years. This
55. Id.
56. Arbeitsschutzgesetz.
57. MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(B).
58. Hilfsdienstgesetz.
59. MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(B).
60. I. Betriebsratsgesetz.
61. MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(B).
62. Gesetz zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit.
63. Aufsichtsratsgesetz.
64. MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(B).
65. See Manfred Weiss, Federal Republic of Germany, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLO-
PAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 29 (Roger Blanpain ed., 1986).
66. See MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(B).
67. Ldnder.
68. The 1972 amendments broadened the scope of works council power. It is worth not-
ing that German labor unions objected to the 1952 Act because of a general feeling among
members that the works council's power was too restricted. Weiss, supra note 65, at 149.
1992]
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can be attributed to the long-standing tradition of employee participa-
tion, employers' overall acceptance of the principle, and labor's con-
siderable support of management.
69
A. Codetermination in Germany
Just as the works council statute dictated plant-level worker par-
ticipation, the Codetermination Act of 197670 introduced the concept
of mandatory equal voice for workers at the supervisory board7' level.
The German corporate model can be contrasted with the United
States corporate model as follows:
69. ILO, supra note 7, at 141.
70. MitbG.
71. Aufsichtsrat.
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FIGURE A
(1) The German Corporation
SUPERVISORY BOARD
(A ufsichtsrat)
Consists of shareholders
and employee representatives
appoints and
supervises
I
BOARD OF MANAGEMENT
(Vorstand)
Sets company policy
(2) The United States Corporation
SHAREHOLDERS
Owners of corporation
I
elect
I
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Sets company policy
I
appoints
I
OFFICERS
Operate business
on day-to-day basis
A German board of management is equivalent to a United States
corporation's board of directors. However, there is no United States
counterpart to a German supervisory board. By statute, the supervi-
sory board has no management functions. 72 Additionally, an individ-
72. AktG § 111, 4.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J[
ual cannot simultaneously serve on both boards. 73 Although the
board of management directs and operates the company, 74 "it must
report to the supervisory board regularly and upon request"75 regard-
ing company affairs.76 The supervisory board may also inspect the
company books and records at any time.77
The 1976 Codetermination Act applies to all businesses that reg-
ularly employ more than 2000 workers. 78 The statute exempts mu-
tual insurance companies, unincorporated businesses, and churches. 79
As of 1990, approximately 450 German businesses were subject to this
legislation,80 which mandates that labor representation on the super-
visory board be at a level just below that of management. 81  The
Codetermination Act also requires that fifty percent of the supervi-
sory board membership8 2 represent the employees. 83 As on the works
council, blue-collar and white-collar supervisory board members
share seats according to their proportion of the employer's labor
force.
84
Supervisory board members are directly elected by the employees
in firms with 8000 or fewer employees. In firms with more than 8000
employees, supervisory board members are elected by delegates. 85
Two or three of the elected employee representatives must be union
representatives, depending upon the size of the workforce. 86 Deci-
sions may be rendered at supervisory board meetings if there is a quo-
rum of at least fifty percent. A vote by a majority of the quorum is
73. Id. § 105.
74. Id. § 76.
75. Id. § 90, 3.
76. Id. § 90.
77. Id. § 111, 1 2.
78. MitbG § l(l)(2).
79. Id. § 1(4)(1).
80. MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(E)(2).
81. MitbG § 7(2).
82. Supervisory boards are comprised of 12 to 20 persons, depending upon the size of the
company. In companies with up to 10,000 employees, the Act requires six shareholder (Anteil-
seigner) representatives and six employee representatives. In companies with 10,001 to 20,000
employees, the Act requires eight of each type of representative. In companies with more than
20,000 employees, the Act requires 10 of each type of representative. Id. § 7(1). The employee
representatives must be at least 18 years old, and they must have been employed by the com-
pany for at least one year. Id. § 7(3).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 11(2).
85. Id. § 9(l)-(2).
86. Id. § 7(2).
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decisive.8 7 If after two such votes the supervisory board is stalemated,
the chairperson casts the determinative vote.8 8 A chairperson and
deputy chairperson are elected from among the members of the super-
visory board by a two-thirds vote.8 9 If the board cannot reach a two-
thirds majority on the first ballot, those members representing share-
holder interests elect the chairperson by majority vote.90
The supervisory board's one-vote-per-member principle is com-
parable to the United States' principle of one-vote-per-share, which
applies to stock corporations. 91 The latter principle clearly allows a
majority shareholder to have the controlling voice in all shareholder
actions. 92 However, the power of German shareholders co-exists with
that of the supervisory board's employee representatives, such that
degree of ownership does not dictate the outcome. Thus, the German
configuration equates the single stockholder supervisory board mem-
ber with his or her employee colleague.
Because these revolutionary requirements diluted management's
power, they met with expected opposition from German employers.
Unions also objected. In the unions' view, the voice of labor was dis-
sipated by the shareholders' power to elect the chairperson when the
board deadlocks, and by the chairperson's power to cast the tie-break-
ing vote.93 After July 1, 1976, the effective date of the statute, a man-
agement coalition petitioned the Federal Constitutional Court94 to
declare the law unconstitutional on two grounds: (1) the Basic Law, 95
the constitution of the FRG, vested private citizens with the right to
87. AktG §§ 5, 11.1, 95.
88. MitbG § 27(1).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 27(1)-(2).
91. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 189 (3d ed. 1983).
92. See 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 762 (1985).
93. ILO, supra note 7, at 89-90; Franz-Juirgen Sicker, The German Model of
Codetermination: Perspectives, Confrontative Issues and Prospective Developments, in MANAGE-
MENT UNDER DIFFERING VALUE SYSTEMS 328 (Ginter Dugos et al. eds., 1981).
94. The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) is Germany's highest
court. It is therefore equivalent to the United States Supreme Court, except that it deals exclu-
sively with questions of constitutional law. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 93.
95. Germany's constitution is called the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The drafters termed it
the Basic Law rather than the Constitution (Verfassung) because, at the time of its drafting,
they anticipated writing a new constitution upon reunification. Simma, supra note 1, at 99 n.5.
However, when Germany reunified, East Germany acceded to the Basic Law, due to consider-
ations of "speed and simplicity." See GG art. 23; DER SPIEGEL, Sept. 3, 1990, at 19.
1992]
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dispose of their property as they wished;96 and (2) the Basic Law as-
sured freedom of association and collective bargaining between equal
parties independent of each other.9 7 Some commentators deemed this
challenge to be an effort to clarify the statute's requirements for man-
agement concessions to union demands, rather than general hostility
to codetermination. 98 On March 1, 1979, the Federal Constitutional
Court ruled that the law was constitutional. 99 This ruling firmly em-
bedded the law in German corporate management.
Other western European countries, however, take an alternate
view. England, France, and Italy consider Germany's codetermina-
tion statute a betrayal of the working class because it "de-radicalize[d]
the trade unions and integrate[d] them into the capitalist system." 1
Indeed, many free enterprise and liberal market economy advocates
perceive codetermination as the "first step toward communism,"10'
although German labor unions and political parties regard the princi-
ple simply as a compromise between capitalism and communism. 102
A member of a board of management who knowingly makes un-
true or misleading statements about the company's financial position
is subject to criminal penalties under German law. 10 3 In stark con-
trast, a supervisory board member who fails to act in a company's
best interest is unlikely to be held even civilly liable.' °4 One long-
serving supervisory board member mused that it is indeed "easier to
get a grip on a slippery eel" than to hold a supervisory board member
liable for damages. 105 Consequently, employees generally are not dis-
suaded from service for fear of liability.
The German parliament's decision to mandate employee repre-
sentation at the supervisory board level, rather than at the board of
management level, was based on two underlying rationales. First, la-
bor delegates generally lack sufficient expertise to participate in actual
management decisions. Second, there is a genuine need for board
96. GG art. 14. For a comparison of this provision in the Basic Law and the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, see infra text accompanying notes 171-77.
97. GG art. 9.
98. MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(E)(7).
99. Judgment of March 1, 1979, 26 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 1.
100. See Saeker, supra note 93, at 312.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. AktG § 400.
104. See Sicker, supra note 93, at 327.
105. Id.
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managers to present themselves to third parties as a homogeneous
body, rather than as a heterogeneous mixture of "them and us."1106
Objections to the codetermination principle remain, despite its
adoption by the German parliament. One objection is that board of
management members depend upon supervisory board labor repre-
sentatives for their re-election. 0 7 Consequently, board of manage-
ment members may feel obligated to favor labor, thereby weakening
the employer's collective bargaining position. Another objection is
that innovative investments will be more difficult to implement be-
cause labor typically emphasizes job retention as the company's main
objective.108 An additional objection is that the labor-management
collusion resulting from codetermination may lead employers to pres-
sure employees involved in the codetermination process to circumvent
laws on competition. 10 9 Further, it is argued that supervisory board
representatives may act in accordance with what they feel is a suitable
return on equity, i.e., interest on money the company borrowed,
rather than in accordance with the actual risk involved. 110
Despite extensive mandatory employee participation in manage-
ment decisions at the supervisory level, the basic capitalist structure
of the FRG is founded on the principle that the employer, not the
employee, is the true owner of production. 111 The German position is
that the parliament, in enacting codetermination laws, has merely de-
termined employees' rights that emanate from their ownership of the
means of production, rather than of the production process itself." 12
According to Professor Franz-Jirgen Sacker, codetermination
may indeed "reduce the dynamism of competitive market
processes."' 113 Professor Sacker concludes that most management
boards will be comprised not of "impatient, enterprising pioneer busi-
nessmen, but of patient, friendly administrators who are keen on com-
promise, avoid making decisions involving high risks and who are
trained in political bureaucratic day-to-day business."' 114 Regardless
of its effects on the marketplace, it is generally accepted that the
106. Id. at 325.
107. Id. at 335.
108. Id. at 335-36.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. HANAU ADOMEIT, 1 ARBEITSRECHT 17 (2d ed. 1988).
112. Id.
113. Sicker, supra note 93, at 336.
114. Id. at 337.
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FRG's codetermination process has extended employee participation
rights beyond those in any other Western country. 115
B. Employees' Management Rights in the Mining, Iron,
and Steel Industries
In 1951, the parliament of the FRG enacted the Act on the Pro-
portional Codetermination of Employees in Enterprises of the Min-
ing, Iron, and Steel-Producing Industries." 16 This statute provides for
employee membership on the boards of management 17 of companies
that have 1000 or more employees.1 18 Under the Codetermination
Act, this is the sole instance in which employee representation is as-
sured directly at the management level.
III. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Collective bargaining in the FRG embraces two types of con-
tracts: (1) contracts between employers and works councils regarding
shop rules; 19 and (2) union contracts with employers. In order to
distinguish between these two types of contracts, it is helpful to com-
pare the contractual role of unions in the FRG with that of the
United States.
The FRG's 1949 Act on Collective Bargaining, which was
amended in 1969, governs union contracts. 120 Unlike the statutory
right to bargain collectively in the United States, 121 the right to asso-
ciate in the FRG has a constitutional basis. 122 The significance of this
distinction is twofold. First, German law emphasizes the fundamen-
tal nature of the right to associate. 123 Second, altering a constitution
is a complex and difficult process, compared to the relative ease of
115. MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(A).
116. Gesetz iiber die paritiitische Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in Bergbauun-
ternehmungen des Eisen und Stahlindustrie-Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz [MontanMitbG],
1951 BGBI. I 347.
117. MontanMitbG section 13 provides that the majority of the employee representatives
on the supervisory board shall name one director, or member of the board of management. See
id. § 13.
118. Id. § 1(2).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 6-69.
120. Tarifvertragsgesetz [TVG], 1969 BGB. 1 1323.
121. See Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.).
122. GG art. 9(3). The Basic Law assures that the "right to form associations to safeguard
and improve working and economic conditions shall be granted to everyone and to all occupa-
tions." Id.
123. The Basic Law, which contains 141 articles, lists many rights that do not appear in
[Vol. 14:275
1992] Works Councils and Employee Codetermination
amending a statute.1 24 The United States' Taft-Hartley Act 125 grants
the right not to associate with a union. 26 In Germany, the Federal
Constitutional Court has determined that the right not to associate is
implied by the express right to associate that is assured by article 9(3)
of the Basic Law.
127
In the United States, the Taft-Hartley Act provides that a union
is the exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit in a
plant or business, with union representatives elected by a majority of
the workers in that unit. 128  Both the employer 29 and the union 3 0
must bargain in "good faith with respect to hours, wages, and terms
and conditions of employment"''a when negotiating to produce a col-
lective bargaining agreement. In Germany, the employer has no cor-
responding duty to bargain.13 2
In the United States, employers may belong to multi-bargaining
groups.13 3 Such groups, however, do not compare to the much larger
groups to which the majority of German employers belong. German
companies generally belong to two associations of employers: a group
the United States Constitution. The United States Constitution contains just seven articles and
has had only 26 amendments in the more than 200 years since its ratification. See U.S. CONST.
124. Article 79 of the Basic Law states that amendments require two-thirds of the voting
members of the federal parliament (Bundestag) and two-thirds of the voting members of the
representatives from the various states (Bundesrat). See GG art. 79. Although not quite as
strict as the United States Constitution's three-fourths state legislature requirement for ratifica-
tion of a proposed constitutional amendment, the Basic Law is indeed difficult to alter. See
U.S. CONST. art. V.
125. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 29 U.S.C.).
126. Id. § 157. Section 158(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act specifies that union shop provi-
sions (clauses providing that an employee must become a union member within a designated
time, not to be less than 30 days, after employment or the effective date of the clause) are
permitted, but section 164(b) allows the individual states to declare such provisions unenforce-
able. Id. §§ 158(a)(3), 164(b). The states that have done so generally are referred to as "right-
to-work" states.
127. 50 BVerfGE 290, 367.
128. Taft-Hartley Act § 159.
129. Id. § 158(a)(5).
130. Id. § 158(b)(3).
131. Id. § 158(d).
132. Weiss, supra note 65, at 128.
133. See 48 AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 669 (1985). For example, the Bitu-
minous Coal Operators' Association, which consists of more than 100 member employers,
negotiates a single contract with the United Mine Workers' Association. Similarly, the Major
League Baseball Owners' Association, consisting of the 26 owners of the National and Ameri-
can League professional baseball clubs, has one contract with the Major League Players'
Association.
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of inter-industrial employers, and a regional group of employers in a
particular industry.
The German associations of inter-industrial employers are not
parties to any collective bargaining agreements, 34 but because a sig-
nificant majority of German companies belong to such groups, 35 they
are nonetheless influential. The largest such association is the Federal
Society of German Employers' Associations.
136
Regional associations consist of employers in a particular indus-
try. The German concept of "industry" is quite broad. For example,
the "metal industry" is an association of employers from the automo-
bile, electric, shipbuilding, and machine-building industries, among
others. 37 Although the union and the employer negotiate the geo-
graphic boundaries of each region, 38 an industry's collective bargain-
ing agreements vary little, if at all, among the regions. a9
Unions are also organized along industrial, rather than craft,
lines.m40 Typically, unions are quite large; the largest, IG Metall, has
approximately 2,681,000 members.' 4 ' Most unions belong to an even
larger association, the German Labor Union Federation, which in
1988 had over 7,000,000 members. 42
German labor law distinguishes between two types of workers:
blue-collar workers (Arbeitern) who are paid wages (Lohn), and
white-collar workers (Angestellten) who are paid salaries (Gehalt ).1 43
Membership in the German Labor Union Federation is approxi-
mately seventy-five percent blue-collar and twenty-five percent white-
collar.'" The members execute a single collective bargaining agree-
134. Dr. Reinhard Richardi, Kommentar zum btirgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einfuhrung-
sgestz und Nebengesetzen, in RECHT DER SCHULDVERHALTNISSE 611-15 (Julius von Staud-
inger ed., 12th ed. 1957).
135. Manfred Weiss et al., The Settlement of Labour Disputes in the Federal Republic of
Germany, in INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN MARKET ECONOMIES 93 (Tadashi
Hanami & Roger Blanpain eds., 1984).
136. Id.
137. Weiss, supra note 32, at 339.
138. Id. at 340. The metal industry, for example, has 16 regions.
139. Id.
140. Sicker, supra note 93, at 319.
141. Id. at 318.
142. Richardi, supra note 134, 239 (citing STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 598 (1988)).
143. Id. Generally, Arbeitern include those who perform manual labor, and Angestellten
include those whose work is mental or discretionary in nature. Id. 334.
144. Id. 917.
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ment that covers both groups. 45 As the concept of Angestellten statu-
torily includes such occupations as ship captain, office administrator,
and plant foreman,'1" it encompasses workers who would be classified
as "supervisors" under United States labor law. 14 7  In the United
States, "supervisors" are expressly excluded from the Taft-Hartley
definition of "employee,"' 148 and cannot be union members for pur-
poses of collective bargaining. Thus, the collective bargaining concept
in the FRG encompasses more workers than its counterpart in the
United States.
In the FRG, the regional unit of an employer's industrial associa-
tion and the union for that industry negotiate the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Therefore, the contract is identical for all workers in
that industry in the particular geographic region. 149 Single employers
may also contract with unions. 150 The governing statute prescribes
strict procedures for collective bargaining agreements with employer
associations, l5 but these procedures are inapplicable to contracts be-
tween a union and a single employer. 152 Although there is no man-
dated form,15 3 the statute requires all collective bargaining agreements
to be in writing. 1
54
Perhaps the most critical distinction between union-employer
contracts in the United States and Germany is the duty of United
States employers to extend contract rights to all employees, regardless
of whether they are union members. 55 The United States employer
145. Id. T 349.
146. Werkmeistern.
147. Section 152(11) of the Taft-Hartley Act defines "supervisor" as
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other em-
ployees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such au-
thority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independ-
ent judgment.
Taft-Hartley Act § 152(11).
148. Id. § 152(3).
149. Richardi, supra note 134, 1 938.
150. Id. A contract to which a regional employer group is a party is called a Verband-
starifvertrag (association collective bargaining agreement), while a contract between a single
employer and a union is called a Firmentarifvertrag (company collective bargaining
agreement).
151. TVG § 2(3).
152. Richardi, supra note 134, 926.
153. Id. 925.
154. TVG § 125(2).
155. Section 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides that an employer may not discrimi-
nate against an employee if the employer has reason to believe that the employee was denied
1992]
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who differentiates between union and non-union employees commits
an unfair labor practice,1 56 since the union, once certified, is the offi-
cial representative of all employees within the bargaining unit. Con-
versely, a German employer may refuse to apply the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement, such as those concerning wages and
retirement benefits, to non-union employees.15" The underlying ra-
tionale is analogous to the consideration element in contract law. By
paying dues, union members are entitled to collective bargaining
agreement benefits as parties to the contract. Non-union employees,
however, do not pay dues and therefore fail to furnish consideration
for the resulting benefits. Thus, only union members may be parties
to the collective bargaining agreement.
158
The union, however, cannot be a party to an agreement to ex-
clude non-members from contractual benefits. 5 9 Such exclusion is
legal only if it is the employer's unilateral decision.' ° Although em-
ployers may choose to extend contractual benefits under collective
bargaining agreements only to union members, in practice, most em-
ployers grant the same contractual rights to non-union employees as a
means of keeping union membership to a minimum. 61 Those who
adhere to the consideration principle view this action as inequitable,
and one commentator has criticized it as a "remarkable consequence
•.. [since] although the exercise of the positive freedom of association
must be bought with an economic sacrifice, approximately one per-
cent of a worker's monthly income [i.e., union dues], the exercise of
the negative freedom of association may not be burdened with the loss
of a vacation bonus."' 6
2
The differences between a union contract and a works council
agreement are illustrated by the following: (1) the ability of the Ger-
man employer to provide union members with favorable treatment
union membership wrongfully. Section 8(a)(3) also permits an employer to require union
membership as a condition of employment. When union membership is a condition of employ-
ment, a United States employer must extend contract rights to all employees qualified to join
the union. See Taft-Hartley Act § 8(a)(3).
156. Id. § 158(a)(3).
157. TVG § 3(1).
158. Id. § 2(1).
159. Wolfgang Daubler, The Individual and the Collective: No Problem for German Labor
Law?, 10 CoMp. LAB. L.J. 505, 511 (1988).
160. TVG § 3(1).
161. Interview with Dr. Franz-Jiirgen Sacker, Dean of the Juristische Fakultiit of Chris-
tian-Albrechts Universitiit at Kiel, in Hamburg, Germany (May 17, 1991).
162. Diiubler, supra note 159, at 511.
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after the union contract has been ratified and executed; and (2) the
contrasting inability of an employee to be excluded from the individ-
ual employer's works council agreement. Generally, a union contract
is between a large union representing a particular industry and a re-
gional group of employers in that industry.163 In contrast, the works
council contract is between one employer and all of the employer's
workers. 164 Thus, the union and the works council cannot be re-
garded as representing conflicting interests. 165 Many union affiliates
are also works council members, even though the Labor-Management
Relations Act 166 gives no privilege or priority to labor unions regard-
ing the election of council members.167
Another difference between the two types of contracts relates to
their form. Union collective bargaining agreements are required by
law to be written documents,' 68 while works council agreements are
not required to be written and are frequently reflected only in the
minutes of the meetings in which they were established.169
The German works council model, unlike the German union-
management contract, is quite similar to the United States' union-
management collective bargaining agreement. The following chart is
illustrative:
163. Weiss, supra note 32, at 340.
164. DAubler, supra note 159, at 513-14.
165. ILO, supra note 7, at 141.
166. BetrVG.
167. ILO, supra note 7, at 137-38.
168. TVG § 125(2).
169. ILO, supra note 7, at 139.
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FIGURE B
GERMANY
Works council agreement:
Employer[ All employees
of employer
Collective bargaining agreement:
All employers Union for
in industry in same industry
geographic on behalf of
region union
members only
UNITED STATES
Collective bargaining
agreement:
Employer Union on
behalf of all
employees
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO WORKS COUNCILS AND
CODETERMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, property rights have historically been re-
garded as inviolate.1 70  The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution1 7' ensures that the federal government will not take
one's property without due process of law 72 or without just compen-
sation.1 73 This latter directive provides for the payment of damages to
a property owner whose land has been converted to public use
170. See, e.g., Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (1795).
171. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
172. "Due process" generally means fundamental fairness. See, e.g., International Shoe v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, the United States Supreme Court
held that the purpose of due process is to ensure the fair and orderly administration of the law.
See id. at 319. Typically, this guarantees a hearing in front of an impartial tribunal before
there is any adverse action affecting one's basic rights. See Ochoa v. Hernandez, 230 U.S. 139
(1912) (holding that the Due Process Clause prevents one's property from being taken and
given to another, without notice and the opportunity for a hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (holding termination of welfare benefits requires pre-termination evidentiary
hearing); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding social security disability benefits
can be terminated with hearing thereafter); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (holding
right to hearing before employment is terminated is required only where entitlement exists).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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through the power of eminent domain. 174 The United States Supreme
Court has construed the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause 175 to apply most of the same prohibitions to the states as the
Bill of Rights proscribes for the federal government. 176 Thus, any
limits that the Fifth Amendment places on Congress likewise apply to
the state legislatures via the Fourteenth Amendment.
77
Constitutional recognition of the value placed upon an individ-
ual's goods, belongings, and premises is also evidenced by the Fourth
Amendment's 178 protection against unlawful searches and seizures.
In See v. City of Seattle,179 the United States Supreme Court held that
this right extends to businesses, as well as to homeowners. 180 The
Court stated, "The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has
a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable
official entries upon his private commercial property."''
It is axiomatic that the owner of a business has a "property
right" in the management of his or her enterprise.8 2 This right is not
absolute-particularly when conflicting rights necessitate an accom-
modation. Such a limitation was applied in NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 183 a case upholding the constitutionality of the Wagner
Act. 18 4 The United States Supreme Court held that the employer's
right to choose its employees was tempered by the employees' right of
freedom of association. 8 5 The Court also affirmed the employer's
right to select or discharge employees so long as the employer is not
motivated by an intent to interfere with the right of employees to
174. The final clause of the Fifth Amendment assures that private property shall not be
"taken for public use without just compensation." Id.
175. Id. amend. XIV.
176. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
177. The Second Amendment, the Third Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment's grand
jury indictment right have not been incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to
the states. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 784 (2d ed. 1991).
178. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
179. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
180. Id. at 546.
181. Id. at 543.
182. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 590 (1979); see also Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312 (1921); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1888); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
36 (1872) (holding that a person's business is "property" within the meaning of the Due Pro-
cess Clause).
183. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
184. See id. at 49.
185. Id. at 43-44 (discussing the employer's right to conduct its business and the employ-
ees' corresponding organizational rights under the statute).
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organize. 186
In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 187 the United States Supreme
Court upheld the right of businesses to prohibit the distribution of
printed materials on business premises. In that case, the Court con-
sidered whether an employer could legally prevent nonemployee
union organizers from distributing union literature in company-
owned parking lots. 8 8 The Court held that the employer could deny
the organizers access to its property so long as "reasonable efforts by
the union through other available channels of communication will en-
able it to reach the employees with its message and if the employer's
notice or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing
other distribution."'' 8 9 Because the employer's plants were close to
small communities where many of the employees lived, various other
methods of imparting information were available to the union or-
ganizers.19° Accordingly, the employer could legally exclude nonem-
ployee union organizers from its parking lots and other company
property. 191
The United States Supreme Court also affirmed the employer's
right to manage company business in Texas Department of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine. 92 In Burdine, a female employee alleged that
her employer's refusal to promote her, and its decision to terminate
her, were based on gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.193 The Court refused to assign the em-
ployer the burden of proving that the male candidate had been better
qualified for the position than the plaintiff.194 Further, the Court
found that "the statute was not intended to 'diminish traditional man-
agement prerogatives,' "195 and thereby confirmed the employer's
right to manage.
Like the judiciary, the United States Congress has recognized the
separation of management from labor, exempting supervisory em-
186. Id. at 45-46.
187. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
188. See id. at 106-14.
189. Id. at 112.
190. Id. at 113.
191. Id. at 113-14.
192. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
193. See id. at 248. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988).
194. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258-59.
195. Id. at 259 (quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 (1979)).
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ployees from coverage under the Taft-Hartley Act. 96 Specifically,
section 152(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act precludes these employees
from associating for collective bargaining purposes. 9
7
The right of business owners to manage is also protected under
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act'98 ("RMBCA"), which
serves as a guide for state corporation law.' 99 The RMBCA provides
that only a corporation's shareholders, who are its owners, may elect
the board of directors.200 The board of directors is thereafter charged
with the duty of managing corporate affairs. 20
A United States employer's collective bargaining agreement with
a union differs in many respects from a German works council con-
tract. First, an employer in the United States is required to negotiate
with a union only after a majority of employees in a bargaining unit
has chosen the union and the National Labor Relations Board has
officially certified the labor organization as the representative of all of
the employees in that bargaining unit. 20 2 In contrast, as few as five
employees of a German company, which may employ thousands, may
demand the establishment of a works council to approve rules that are
applicable to all company employees.203
Second, the United States employer is required under the Taft-
Hartley Act to bargain with the union concerning wages, hours, and
the terms and conditions of employment. 2°4 Further, the United
States Supreme Court has carefully avoided extending the concept of
"terms and conditions of employment" to traditionally accepted pow-
ers of management. 20 5 In contrast, the German works council can
object to an exhaustive list of twelve areas concerning workplace rules
proposed by management. 2°6 Thus, the powers of the German works
196. See Taft-Hartley Act § 152(3).
197. Id.
198. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1985).
199. See id. at Introduction.
200. Id. §§ 7.28(a), 7.28 cmt.
201. Id. §§ 8.01(b), 8.01 cmt.
202. Taft-Hartley Act § 159(a).
203. BetrVG § 1.
204. Taft-Hartley Act § 158(d).
205. For cases holding various subjects not to be mandatory bargaining topics, see Allied
Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971) (changes in
medical insurance coverage for retired former employees); First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (employer's decision to close part of its business for purely eco-
nomic reasons); Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) (employer's decision to relocate
research and development operations in an effort to achieve better organizational efficiency).
206. MitbG § 87; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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council extend considerably farther than the three United States sub-
ject areas.
Third, United States employers generally enjoy the legal right to
terminate employment at will,2o7 provided that such termination does
not breach the employment contract 20 8 or violate an established pub-
lic policy. 20 9 Statutory provisions guarantee employees the right not
to be discharged because of race, color, sex, religion, national ori-
gin,210 or age.211 In addition, the Occupational Safety and Health
Act 21 2 and the Taft-Hartley Act 213 prohibit retaliatory discharge in
response to an employee's exercise of statutory rights. If termination
does not violate any of these statutory principles, the United States
employer may terminate at will in the majority of jurisdictions.21 4
Conversely, a German employment contract is statutorily presumed
to be terminable only for cause. 215 This German law arguably
abridges the concept of the employer's management rights.
Although the statutory rights of individual employees in the
207. See 48 AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 9 (1985); see, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980) (physician demoted for refusing to conduct
research using substance she deemed dangerous to health of patients); Chin v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1979);
Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976); Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc.,
362 S.E.2d 915 (Va. 1987) (employer had right to discharge employee in retaliation for partici-
pation in an employment-related grievance hearing).
208. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich.
1980) (discharge without cause is unlawful when employment manual indicates company pol-
icy is to terminate for cause only); Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J.
1985) (employment manual stating that an employee may be discharged only for cause is en-
forceable against the employer unless there is a clear and prominent disclaimer).
209. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985) (em-
ployee discharged after refusal to engage in activities during employee camping trip, such acts
being contrary to state statute prohibiting indecent exposure); Petermann v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959) (employee discharged after refusal to commit perjury
before a congressional committee investigating the employer's activities); Frampton v. Central
Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973) (employee discharged because he had filed workers'
compensation claim against employer); Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797
(Va. 1985) (employees terminated after claiming their proxies were obtained under duress pur-
suant to management's direction, in violation of state law assuring stockholders the right to
vote shares according to their own volition).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
211. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1967).
212. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678, 660(c)(1) (1970).
213. Taft-Hartley Act § 158(a)(3)-(4).
214. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employment at Will: The Relationship Between Socie-
tal Expectations and the Law, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 455, 457 (1990).
215. KSchG § 1.
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United States have increased considerably, 21 6 only in the Taft-Hartley
Act are the collective rights of workers assured. These collective
rights are exercisable only by a majority vote, and clearly do not en-
croach upon true management powers. Despite expansive congres-
sional recognition of workers' rights in recent years,21 7 the United
States judiciary, like the federal and state legislatures, has tenaciously
adhered to the concept that management has rights that cannot be
divested. 218 The traditional shareholder election of the corporate
managing body is but one example of a management right that cannot
be divested.219 Firmly entrenched in United States law is the under-
standing that even a union chosen by the majority of workers cannot
assume management privileges.
220
Would a legislatively mandated works council or codetermina-
tion right according to the German model usurp or impinge upon
management rights? If so, would courts consider such an encroach-
ment as being of the "necessary" variety sanctioned by the United
States Supreme Court in Babcock & Wicox Co.? 221 Certainly, the
works council's right to object to an employer's planned discharge or
transfer of an employee is contrary to the employment-at-will rule
that prevails in the United States. 222 In addition, the works council's
participation in drafting workplace rules is a clear exercise of manage-
ment powers. Further, the German Codetermination Act explicitly
empowers workers to participate in management activity by assuring
them an equal voice in electing and subsequently supervising the
board of managers. 22
3
This author contends that legislation implementing either works
councils or codetermination, or both, in the United States would un-
necessarily violate the employer's property rights ensured by the Fifth
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and arguably, the Fourth
Amendment. Although the German constitution also grants each
216. See supra notes 202-14 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (holding that
employees' contractual commitments not to join unions while employed ("yellow-dog" con-
tracts) are enforceable). Congress later declared such contracts unenforceable in the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1926) and in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-
115 (1932).
218. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 105; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248.
219. See supra text accompanying note 201.
220. See supra text accompanying note 205.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 187-91.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 207-14.
223. See MitbG.
1992] 299
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J
person the discretionary right to use and dispose of his property,224
Germany's Federal Constitutional Court has upheld the constitution-
ality of the Codetermination Act against an invasion of property
rights claim. 22
5
Perhaps the difference between the FRG's and the United States'
understanding of "property rights" can be attributed to the FRG's
elevation of the right to associate to constitutional status. 226 Indeed,
the fact that the right to associate is included among the so-called
"Basic Rights" 227 presumably places it in a position of priority over
property rights. Quite likely, these two German statutes are simply
the lawmakers' method of balancing the two constitutionally assured
rights. No such rationale would be applicable in the United States,
since the collective rights of workers are not granted constitutional
protection, but are only protected by statute.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the 1979 Federal Constitutional Court ruling, German
businesses have been surprisingly complacent and non-resistant 228 to
the parliamentary acts mandating employee input into what United
States courts have recognized as management prerogatives. United
States employers would assume a more combative role if Congress or
the state legislatures proposed similar mandatory employee par-
ticipatory rights in management decision making.
Most likely, United States courts would find such an intrusion
upon traditionally accepted management prerogatives to be a "tak-
ing" of an employer's property. 229 Consequently, United States
courts would strike down such legislation as unconstitutional. Ac-
cordingly, anything less than an amendment to the United States
Constitution probably renders the adoption of either of these two
German principles unlikely. The line of demarcation separating man-
agement from labor powers in the United States is therefore quite
secure.
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